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The Economic-Political Crisis in Brazil: a Reading from Some Reflections of Gramsci
Abstract
Since the nineteen sixties, Gramsci has been one of the main authors inspiring the renewal of Marxism, the
resistance of popular movements to the military dictatorship, and the formation of political organizations in
the process of democratization in Brazil. Various of his categories, such as “passive revolution”, “transformism”,
the “expanded State”, “war of movement/war of position”, “national-popular”, “hegemony” etc., have often
served as a basis for interpreting the history and politics of Brazil. But, in his writings there is also a set of
reflections that depict situations which are much closer to the economic and political crisis currently affecting
Brazil. Among other aspects, in fact, Gramsci’s work, written between the two great wars of the last century, is
characterized by the analysis of the “organic crisis” of bourgeois society, by the search for the reasons of the
defeat of the revolutionary movement, and by the new possibilities opened to the “subaltern classes” in crucial
historical circumstances. In the light of this background, in these few pages we will discuss the current political
situation of Brazil taking into account especially the Observations on Certain Aspects of the Structure of Political
Parties in Periods of Organic Crisis (Q13, § 23, pp. 1602-1613; SPN, pp. 210-218 and concluding part on pp.
167-168) and on the modern forms of Caesarism (Q13, § 27, pp. 1619-1622; SPN, pp. 219-222)*.
* Gramsci, A., Quaderni del carcere, ed. V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975. In the body of the text, this edition
is quoted as QC, followed by the number of the notebook, the number of the paragraph (where necessary also
the sub-paragraph) and page of the Italian edition, data which allow quotations to be located in the Brazilian
and other integral editions. Page references are also given to English translations (SPN for Gramsci 1971; PN,
vols. I, II and III for Gramsci 1992, 1996 and 2007 respectively; and FSPN for Gramsci 1995).
Keywords
Gramsci, Bonapartism, Organic Crisis, Political and Economic Crisis, Brazil, Lulism
This journal article is available in International Gramsci Journal: http://ro.uow.edu.au/gramsci/vol2/iss2/7
«International Gramsci Journal», Vol. 2, 2017, n. 2, 89-106. 
ISSN: 1836-6554	
	
The Economic-Pol i t i ca l  Cris i s  in Brazi l :   
a Reading from Some Ref l e c t ions o f  Gramsci 
 
Giovanni Semeraro 
 
 
1. The end of a political cycle 
 In June 2013, on the eve of the Confederations Cup, huge 
demonstrations broke out in Brazil occupying squares and streets in 
over 300 cities and uncovering the deep crisis latent in the country. 
On posters, slogans and in the symbology used, demonstrators 
expressed their anger at the reduction in the country’s growth rate 
and at basic demands never being met, while large investments were 
made in overpriced projects to ensure the world that the football 
extravaganza orchestrated by FIFA (Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association) would actually take place. Triggered by social 
networks in a ‘spontaneous’ and apparently chaotic way, those mass 
mobilizations, expressing various forms of dissent, claimed the ‘Fifa 
standard’ for public services and protested against corruption, 
precarious work and the loss of purchasing power. The sudden 
explosion, which drew into its vortex a multiplicity of even 
opposing interests and a mix of social groups, was, in fact, the 
expression of “a whole series of questions which [had] piled up in a 
molecular form” (QC 15, § 59, p. 1824; SPN, p. 106)1 in a country 
whose government no longer represented an aggregating and 
consensual project. A very similar picture is portrayed by Gramsci 
when he describes aspects of the “organic crisis” which occurs  
 
1) because the previously passive great masses went into motion, but it was 
chaotic, disorganized motion, without leadership, that is, without a precise 
collective political will; 2) because […] the middle classes […] found 
themselves unemployed, precisely after having completed their apprenticeship 
in positions of authority etc.; 3) because the antagonistic forces turned out to 
be incapable of organizing the actual disorder to their advantage (QC 7, § 80, 
pp. 912-913; PN, Vol. III, p. 211). 
  
																																								 																				
1 The SPN translation is modified to take account of the importance that “molecularly” has 
attained in Gramsci and Gramscian studies [editorial note]. 
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Taken by surprise and stunned, authorities sought to circumvent 
popular revolt, at first with repression but later metabolizing a few 
demands with palliative measures and generic promises of reform. 
Without seeing any real effect, pressures started up again after the 
2014 elections. Since the end of 2014, in fact, when Dilma 
Rousseff, from the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT), 
was re-elected President of the Republic with a very slim majority 
of the popular vote, society clearly revealed its division and people 
slowly began to realize the gravity of the crisis that had hit Brazil. 
The dramatic economic and political situation was compounded by 
the numerous cases of corruption revealed by “Operation Car 
Wash” (Operação Lava-Jato), triggered by the Federal Police and the 
Public Ministry when they discovered a ‘kickback’ scheme in 
Petrobras, a strategic state-owned company due to its high earnings 
and investments. 
An impressive list of politicians of various parties (including 
ministers and chairmen of the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate) and of government officials, bribed by major construction 
companies and private firms, shocked the population, putting on 
display not only the climate of impunity prevailing in the country 
and the frightening hole in the government’s coffers, but, above all, 
the predatory culture that rages in many sectors of society and the 
lack of an effective democracy on account of the strength of large 
economic groups. In the same period, “Operation Zelotes”, 
promoted by the Brazilian Internal Revenue Service (Receita Federal), 
the Federal Police, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and the 
Internal Affairs Office of the Ministry of Treasury, unveiled a tax 
evasion scheme which initially amounted to over 20 billion 
Brazilian real (in round terms now between 5 and 6 billion euros or 
US dollars), defrauded at the Administrative Tax Appeals Council 
(Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais – CARF), where reduction 
services were sold or the debt of banks and large companies (such 
as, for example, Santander, Bradesco, Gerdau, RBS – affiliate of 
Rede Globo etc) disappeared. In addition to this, Wikileaks disclosed 
information on secret accounts in the Swiss branch of HSBC Bank, 
which included the names of 8667 Brazilians, alleged to have stolen 
considerable amounts from the country in undeclared currency. 
The PT, involved in corruption scandals, won a fourth term with 
the aid of much electoral juggling, but saw this result become a 
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“Pyrrhic victory”. To ensure a minimum of governability, in fact, 
the government of the President was required to set up a harsh 
fiscal adjustment, completely contradicting its campaign promises, 
and to make huge concessions to the allied parties, most of which 
had positions totally against its program. In this way, with the 
Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in the hands 
of the PMDB (now numerically the largest party), the basis of the 
parliamentary support started to vote opportunistic and reactionary 
guidelines, which further deepened the crisis that was devastating 
the country. But, the greatest disaster suffered by the PT has been 
the loss of credibility in the larger sectors of society, the dropout of 
many militants, popular organizations and intellectuals frustrated by 
the lack of consistency and distortion of the party. For somewhat 
more than a couple of years, then, it has not constituted a 
hegemonic force in the country capable of aggregating consent, 
giving unity and political direction to the nation, a situation which 
has therefore led to the creation of a dangerous vacuum that 
generates uncertainty, social disarray and rise of adventurists and 
predators. Taking advantage of the “crisis of command and 
leadership when spontaneous consent undergoes a crisis” (QC 4, § 
49, p. 476; PN Vol. II, p. 201), the massive advances of financial 
capital, business and the right-wing media – upset by the fourth 
defeat in elections and by social spending, launched relentless 
attacks in order to disqualify the PT and (successfully) demand the 
resignation and impeachment of now ex-President Rousseff. After 
having taken this risky path, which may be considered as 
representing one of institutional rupture and a “white coup”, the 
opposition forces continued to make the PT-led government bleed 
by imposing a harsh neoliberal agenda on it, with the intention of 
paving the way for an overwhelming victory in the next elections, 
the recent municipal ones of autumn 2016, and in the state and 
national elections, in 2018. 
It is also to be noted that, in recent years, the situation in Brazil 
has been worsening due to the long period of drought which has 
affected agriculture and the water system of strategic regions, in 
addition to a set of external factors, such as the world economic 
crisis, protectionism practiced by the United States and the 
European Union, the reduction of growth in China and Russia and 
the disintegration of trading partners in the Middle East and Africa. 
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To these ingredients one must add the contraction of leftist parties 
that is occurring around the world and the wearing down of 
progressive governments in Latin America, articulated around 
projects such as MERCOSUR, UNASUR, CELAC, ALBA and 
contrary to the interests of the United States. Although significant, 
however, these factors do not exempt the PT from responsibilities 
regarding mistakes in political strategy and economy management, 
accommodation, omission, engagement in acts of corruption and 
the apparatus of the State conducted by it. A political agglutination 
that has marked the history of Brazil over the last 35 years, which 
now can no longer “[…] really causes the whole society to move 
forward, not merely satisfying its own existential requirements, but 
continuously augmenting its cadres for the conquest of every new 
sphere of economic and productive activity” (QC 19, § 24, p. 2012; 
SPN, p. 60). In this way, if the bureaucracy “feels itself independent 
of the mass of members, the party ends up by becoming 
anachronistic and at moments of acute crisis it is voided of its social 
content and left as though suspended in mid-air” (QC 13, § 23, p. 
1604; SPN, p. 211). Today, in fact, it is practically unanimous to 
consider that the cycle of the PT, dominated by corporatism and 
entrenched in the remnants of governmental power, is heading 
towards decline because it lost the ability to create an “[…] organic 
unity between theory and practice, between intellectual strata and 
popular masses, between rulers and ruled” (QC 13, § 36, p. 1635, 
SPN, p. 190). In 1930, in the fascist prison, Gramsci warned that  
 
Ignoring and, even worse, disdaining the so-called ‘spontaneous’ 
movements – that is declining  to give them a conscious leadership and raise 
them to a higher level by inserting them into politics – may often have very 
bad and serious consequences. It is almost always the case that a ‘spontaneous’ 
movement of the subaltern classes is matched by a reactionary movement of 
the right wing of the dominant class, for concomitant reasons: an economic 
crisis, for example, produces, on the one hand, discontent among the subaltern 
classes and spontaneous mass movements and, on the other, conspiracies by 
reactionary groups, who take advantage of the objective enfeeblement of the 
government to attempt coups d’état. Among the efficient causes of these 
coups d’état, one must include the failure of the responsible groups to give 
conscious leadership to the spontaneous rebellions and thus enable them to 
become a positive political factor. (QC 3, § 48, p. 331; PN, Vol. II, p. 51; 
alternative wording in SPN, p. 199). 
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After 2003, when it won the Presidency of the Republic and the 
government of important cities and states of the country, the PT 
started to consolidate itself in power thanks to a favourable external 
economic environment and to the social programs that ensured its 
popular support. Even in the years of the major crisis that exploded 
in the world in 2008, countercyclical internal measures managed to 
avoid the erosion of wages and jobs. But, throughout its mandates, 
the party, which from its formation had been noted for its “new 
way of doing politics”, and for a unique process of popular 
participation, gradually lost these features, took it easy and adopted 
ambiguous positions. In fact, leading a contradictory 
administration, it sought to promote the public by favouring private 
interests; multiplied paternalistic policies and at the same time made 
the élite richer and facilitated huge profits for banks; boosted the 
primary exporter sector with a large production of commodities at 
the cost of a high degree of pollution and intensive use of 
pesticides; appeased the misery of the most abandoned sectors with 
“bolsas” programs, raised the minimum wage, opened credit lines 
and access to the university. It did not however reduce inequality 
since it avoided substantial transformations, namely agrarian and 
urban reforms, fiscal and political reforms, audit of the government 
debt and of the financial system, media democratization and fair 
distribution of the wealth produced collectively. Without fighting 
the mechanisms that reproduce the concentration of wealth and 
without promoting an “intellectual and moral reform” of the 
popular classes such as to place them in a position to exercise their 
sovereignty, it is not possible to reach an effectively fair and 
democratic society. 
The sovereignty of a country, in fact, consists not only in fighting 
poverty, in increasing production and in having citizens functional 
to the system, but depends essentially on the promotion of self-
government and the socialization of politics and common assets – 
the most fundamental of all rights – without which a people cannot 
be a free and respectable subject. This is the deepest sense that 
Gramsci gives to democracy when he defines it as the system that 
must promote the transition of citizens from their condition of 
ruled to rulers, from the position of governed to governors (QC 8, § 
191, p. 1056; PN, Vol. III, p. 345). 
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When it became reconciled to social and economic groups with 
no national-popular commitment and promoted developmental 
projects to achieve “what is possible within the capitalist model” 
(Boito, 2012), the PT administration continued to allow the 
concentration of wealth and land in the hands of a few, to 
indiscriminately throw the doors open for investors and imports, 
and somewhat strangely, to increase the debt on its checking 
account due to an absurd primary surplus that set stratospheric 
interest rates and introduced one of the most perverse mechanisms 
of transfer of income from labor to financial speculation. 
Indeed, both the conciliatory government of Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva (2003-2010) and the managerial centralism of Dilma Vana 
Rousseff (2011-2016), which even tried (unsuccessfully) to reduce 
interest rates and bank profits (Singer, 2015, pp. 47 et seq.), gave in 
to the typical formula of “class coexistence”, which does not 
compromise the socio-economic structure, and to the 
“miscegenation” of the politics that characterizes the history of 
Brazil. This is a phenomenon that the leading sociologist Francisco 
de Oliveira portrays as the production of a “platypus” (the 
“ornitorrinco” of Oliveira’s 2003 volume) since it seeks to combine 
savage capitalism with paternalistic social benefits, ensures the 
controlled reproduction of inequality and naturalizes the 
contradictions of a “left which governs with its right hand”. 
However, to reach governmental power with the popular vote and 
then to continue to reproduce the current system is fatal to the left. 
In this sense, “Lulism” (Singer, 2012) and the transformation of its 
government in a state-Bonapartist party (cf. QC 3, § 119, p. 387; 
PN, Vol. II. pp. 105-106) led to a separation between political 
society and civil society, a demobilization of the popular 
movements and to an “illusory conciliation” of antagonistic 
interests rather than to a “passive revolution in the Brazilian way”. 
Gramsci, in fact, even when he acknowledges the occurrence of 
“molecular changes” or “modifications” (QC 15, § 11, 1767; SPN, 
p. 109) and of “relatively ‘progressive’” elements (QC, 14, §23; 
SPN, p. 223) in processes of “passive revolution”, leaves no doubt 
when he refers to the attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable. Such 
tests, indeed, are  
 
non-organic creations, because they are contradictory, because they are 
intended to reconcile opposed and contradictory interests; their ‘historicicity’ 
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will be brief because contradiction appears after each event of which they have 
been the instrument. The philosophy of praxis, on the other hand, does not 
aim at the peaceful resolution of existing contradictions in history and society 
but is rather the very theory of these contradictions. It is not the instrument of 
government of the dominant groups in order to gain the consent of and 
exercise hegemony over the subaltern classes; it is the expression of these 
subaltern classes who want to educate themselves in the art of government and 
have an interest in knowing all truths, even the unpleasant ones, and in 
avoiding the (impossible) deceptions of the upper class and – even more – 
their own (QC 10, Part II, § 41XII, p. 1319-1320; FSPN, pp. 395-396).  
 
An alert in this direction had been released by, among others, 
Carlos Nelson Coutinho when, in 1999, in view of the ongoing 
crisis, he called attention to the difference between “social 
democratic reformism” tamed by the established order and  
 
a reformist-revolutionary strategy that will maintain the overcoming of 
capitalism as an objective, devising socialism as the ultimate goal of a historic era 
marked by profound and progressive structural reforms (Coutinho, 2000, p. 
116). 
 
 
2. Reasons for the crisis 
Regardless of the analysis that will be drawn from the PT 
government, the fact is that Brazil which, between 2004 and 2012 
showed an annual growth rate of 5% asserting itself as the fifth 
world economy, is now facing a bitter recession of 3%, an inflation 
rate of 10%, an unemployment rate that rose from 9% to 11.9% 
(year-end to year-end 2015-2016), a currency devaluation of over 
50% against the dollar and the closure of many industries, which 
has led to disastrous consequences for the population previously 
animated by the hopes of a reduction of poverty and of better 
living conditions. The situation in Brazil has become even more 
dramatic as, on the one hand, we see the exhaustion of the political 
hegemony of the PT and, on the other hand, it seems that there is 
no other political power or leadership able to promote “the fusion 
of an entire social group under a single leadership, which alone is 
held to be capable of solving an over-riding problem of its 
existence and fending off a mortal danger” (QC 13, § 23, p. 1604; 
International Gramsci Journal No. 6 (2nd Series / Seconda Serie) March / Marzo 2017	 	
	
	 96	
SPN, p. 211).2 Thus, while in the population disbelief in politics and 
disappointment with regard to the parties has been spreading, “[…] 
the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, 
morbid phenomena the most varied kind occur” (QC 3, § 34, p. 
311; PN Vol. II, p. 33). This represents a more dangerous situation, 
as Gramsci notes in Notebook 4 (in a so-called “A” text, i.e. a first 
draft, of 1930), since  
 
it spreads to all the political parties and among all the different classes; […]. 
The crisis is dangerous when the rank and file of one or more parties does not 
go over very quickly to another party that better epitomizes the general 
interest. (QC 4, § 69, p. 513; PN, Vol. II, p. 241). 
 
A few years later, in the second draft (a “C” text) recorded in one 
of the “special” notebooks (Q 13, § 23: 1932-1934),3 as though he 
were describing the situation underway in Brazil, Gramsci remarks 
that  
 
At a certain point in their historical lives, social groups become detached 
from their traditional parties. In other words, the traditional parties, in that 
particular organisational form, with the particular men who constitute, 
represent and lead them, are no longer recognized by their class (or fraction of 
a class) as its expression. When such crises occur, the immediate situation 
becomes delicate and dangerous, because the field is open for violent solutions, 
for the activities of unknown forces represented charismatic “men of destiny” 
[…]. In every country the process is different, although the content is the 
same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony,  
 
unable as it is, to meet the expectations of the popular masses 
which  
 
put forward demands which taken altogether, albeit not organically 
formulated, add up to a revolution (QC, § 13, pp. 1602-1603; SPN, p. 210). 
 
The disaggregation of a party that has catalysed the country’s 
renewal and has united much of the popular movements over the 
last few decades, along with the uneasiness also observed in many 
																																								 																				
2 Here again the translation is brought into line with the QC original by substituting 
“group” for SPN’s “class” [editorial note]. 
3 The dating of Notebook 13 is notoriously difficult; even Gianni Francioni, editor of the 
anastatic version of the Notebooks (Gramsci 2009, Vol. 14, p. 154), has been unable to date its 
paragraphs to more exactly than mid-1932 to November 1933 [editorial note]. 
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union organizations associated with the allied United Workers’ 
Center (Central Única dos Trabalhadores – CUT), has been skilfully 
exploited by conservative forces to unleash a new offensive of 
capital aimed at enlarging the regime of precariousness and 
increasing outsourcing and cuts in public services. In this way, if in 
the past decade, in the reflux of neoliberal policies in Latin 
America, the PT was useful to the interests of the bourgeoisie to 
control the growing wave of popular mobilizations, now, the 
economic crisis, which has been weakening the party, has become 
the best excuse to get rid of a party whose organization and 
continuity, even with its ambiguities, represents a threat and a 
burden to the free action of the economic power and to the 
advancement of a reactionary wave in Brazil and in Latin America. 
In this very delicate and unpredictable process,  
 
[t]he crisis creates situations which are dangerous in the short run, since the 
various strata of the population are not all capable of orienting themselves 
equally swiftly. The traditional ruling class, which has numerous trained cadres, 
changes men and programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the 
subaltern classes, reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp” (QC 
13, § 23, p. 1603; SPN, p. 210). 
 
And in fact, what is going on in Brazil is not exactly a power 
vacuum as many analysts argue, because a vacuum does not exist, 
much less in politics. Representatives of finance capital, of 
international corporations and large companies, federations of 
industry and commerce and the corporate media, with their poses 
as scholars and saviours, started to directly occupy key posts in the 
government (Treasury, Planning, Agriculture, Mines and Energy, 
Industry and Trade, Science and Technology, Health etc.) and to 
impose a fiscal adjustment aimed at ensuring that the primary 
surplus was intended to pay bankers and speculators in public debt 
securities, to downgrade salaries, to relax the Consolidation of 
Labour Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho – CLT), to 
commercialize social rights and to install a ‘minimum State’. 
Although every country and every historical circumstance show 
different processes, we can also find precious elements to better 
understand what has been taking place in Brazil in Gramsci’s 
reflections on “Caesarism”, a phenomenon which can be said to 
“express a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each 
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other in a catastrophic manner” (QC 13, § 27, p. 1619; SPN, p. 219) 
and cancel each other, giving rise to a situation of ‘ungovernability’ 
that paves the way for an “solution by ‘arbitrage’” (loc. cit.),4 by the 
intervention of technicians and professionals from large financial 
institutions specialized in ‘cleaning up’, and which are ‘free’ of 
ideological influences – as if it were possible to separate economy 
from politics. Currently, indeed, the developmental project has no 
political and social forces strong enough on which to support itself, 
but the ‘adjustment’ policies are also meeting with resistance in 
society. This lack of definition, in which “no group, neither the 
conservatives nor the progressives, has the strength for victory” 
(QC 13, § 23, p. 1604; SPN, p. 211), and the lack of an alternative 
political pole, favor the growth of a particular form of “Caesarism” 
in Brazil. The need to implement ‘urgent’ measures of austerity that 
could put the country ‘back on track’ has created a ‘state of 
exception’ situation, enabling the approval of regressive projects, 
paralyzing political action and putting the population in a painful 
standby position. Moving away from “the assessment made by 
Marx in his celebrated 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” (Liguori, 2009, 
p. 124), as well as the classic examples of “Caesarism” manifested in 
the figures of Caesar and Napoleon (“progressive” Caesarism) or of 
Napoleon III and Bismarck (“reactionary Caesarism”), Gramsci 
notes that “In the modern world, with its great economic-trade-
union and party-political coalitions, the mechanism of the Caesarist 
phenomenon is different from what it was up to Napoleon III” 
(QC 9, § 133, p. 1195),5 since  
 
a Caesarist solution can also exist without a Caesar, without any great 
‘heroic’ and representative personality. The parliamentary system has also 
provided a mechanism for such compromise solutions. […] Every coalition 
government is a first stage of Caesarism, which either may or may not develop 
to more significant stages (the common opinion of course is that coalition 
governments, on the contrary, are the most ‘solid bulwark’ against Caesarism) 
(QC 13, § 27, pp. 1619-1620; SPN, p. 220). 
 
																																								 																				
4 We here substitute “solution by arbitrage” in an attempt to come closer to Gramsci’s 
“soluzione ‘arbitrale’” than SPN’s “particular solution” [editorial note].  
5 Cf. the rewritten “C” text of Q 13, §23 (SPN p. 220), whose only modification is not to 
include the word “very” before “different”, present instead in the “A” text [editorial note]. 
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And in fact, since the PT formed a coalition government with 
the conservative forces, it ended up creating an amalgam between 
contrasting “forces which could in the last analysis fuse and unify, 
albeit after a wearying and bloody process” (QC 13, § 27, p. 1622; 
SPN, p. 222). But, this ambiguous game that has been taking place 
between apparently “contrasting” parties does not hide a deeper 
reality that is a concern in Brazilian politics. Due to bribes and 
generous campaign fundings, passed on by large companies, in 
addition to the lobbying of powerful economic groups and the 
pressures of the monopolized media, parliamentarians undertake 
responsibilities with an autocratic and undemocratic power that 
bypasses the voters’ choice, manipulates the Congress and public 
institutions, empties democracy and subdues national sovereignty, 
thus giving way to a ‘camouflaged Caesarism’ consolidated in 
periods of the fragility and mutual destruction of conflicting 
political groups. Gramsci adds that the activity of this “modern 
Caesarism” does not need to resort to the army or to brute force, 
since “The functionaries of the parties and economic unions can be 
corrupted or terrorised, without any need for military action in the 
grand style – of the Caesar or 18 Brumaire type” (QC, 13 § 27, p. 
1620; SPN, p. 220). Thus, using powerful means of persuasion and 
a sophisticated technological arsenal, Gramsci notes, “[…] modern 
Caesarism is more a police than a military system” (QC, 13 § 27, p. 
1622; SPN, p. 222), meaning that it is “[…] police in a broad 
sense”, i.e., “[…] not only in the state service directed to the 
repression of crime, but in the ensemble of organised state and 
private forces to protect the political and economic dominion of 
the ruling class” (p. 1620). The strategy of this “modern 
Caesarism”, made of plots and espionage, of boycotts and embargo, 
of economic blackmail and investor flight, of smear campaigns and 
of criminalization of the ‘enemy’, is the most widely used mode in 
our time to disable the socializing and democratic potential of 
popular movements, to destabilize ‘unreliable’ governments and to 
pave the way to the invasion and destruction of whole countries 
(Losurdo, 2014, pp. 71-76). 
As we all know, in the history of Brazil, except for brief 
parentheses of democratic periods, the power conducted ‘from 
outside and from above’ has always been present. Today, giving 
continuity to this tradition and imposing themselves as the 
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dominant components, there are the financial system, market 
savagery and media monopoly, which conduct the destinies of the 
country in a “Caesarist” way. Although not seen directly, this 
unquestionable power establishes prices, interest rates and currency 
value, determines the type of production, of commerce, of 
urbanization, of social services and benefits, deforests and 
concentrates huge tracts of land, freely syphons off the country’s 
foreign currency, bribes politicians, kills with impunity Indians, 
Blacks and poor people in the slums, builds a powerful ideological 
apparatus, installs an extensive private network of schools and 
universities, favours the dissemination of narcotizing churches and 
the diffusion of a stupid and empty culture. 
People who think this an exaggerated picture of the situation 
ignore that, in the composition of the National Congress, large 
landowners, industrialists, the great businessmen, evangelicals and 
“the bullet bench” predominate. A framework that has driven the 
experienced Congressman Ivan Valente to state that “What we 
have there [in the Legislative] today is an apparatus, which I would 
say is almost of the mafia-type” (Valente, 2015, p. 21). Shielded in 
the distant Central Plateau, similar to economic and business offices 
in their modern castles, the island of ‘the representatives of the 
people’ has become a kind of ‘big brother’ television show, far from 
national reality, impervious to national protests and strikes, 
refractory to debate and to popular consultation and in a situation 
of visible “decomposition” [of parliamentarianism] (QC 4, § 22, 
442; PN Vol. II, p. 162). To remain in the government at any cost, 
the PT had to adjust and make big concessions to this system, 
creating programs that blend social assistance with neoliberalism, 
leading the party to progressively drawing away from popular 
aspirations and from the creation of a new project for society. 
Following the path of permeable and reformist centre-left parties in 
Europe, which try to survive by meekly managing capitalism, the 
PT started to abandon its distinctive stance. It did not realize that 
the action of confronting the insidious forms of Caesarism used by 
capitalism in today’s world is far different from the actions of 
resistance to military dictatorship. The current form of domination, 
which is particularly engendered in the impenetrable intricacies of 
the financial system and in the charms of the media, is more subtle 
and seductive and, at the same time, is highly corrosive and 
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totalizing. The rise of this “soft Caesarism” (Losurdo, 1993, p. 284), 
as a matter of fact, has not been taking place only in the economic 
sphere, in the State apparatus and in the media, but is also 
progressing to privatizating public services, to anaesthetizing 
consciences, and is even stealing the scene of the popular 
movements themselves when it mobilizes significant social groups 
on the streets. That is what has been going on, for example, with 
the movement “Come into the Street” (Vem para a Rua) and 
“Students for Freedom” (Estudantes pela Liberdade – EPL – founded 
in 2012 and inspired by the “Students for Liberty” of the United 
States), which gave way to “Free Brazil Movement” (Movimento 
Brasil Livre – MBL), organizations funded by the Koch Brothers 
and the ATLAS Economic Research Foundation, aimed at training 
young Latin Americans to combat “left” governments and defend 
old stances in new languages (Brasil de Fato, 2015, pp. 4-5). As Marx 
had observed, capitalism does not focus only on economic 
structures, but also determines the model of social relations, the 
process of subjectivity production and the diffusion of common 
sense, since, as observed above, “the class which has the means for 
material production has, at the same time, the means for intellectual 
production” (Marx-Engels, 1998, p. 48).6 We can therefore 
understand Gramsci’s insistence on conducting “a study of how the 
ideological structure of a ruling class is actually organized: that is, 
the material organization meant to preserve, defend, and develop 
the theoretical or ideological ‘front’” (QC 3, § 49, p. 332-3; PN Vol. 
II, p. 52). A much more urgent need in a country like Brazil – 
where the imposing power of newspapers, magazines, television 
networks, churches, schools and civil society organizations are in 
the hands of the ruling class and of international capital – makes 
this domain practically absolute. 
 
 
3. New possibilities for popular forces 
Thirty years after the end of the dictatorship, Brazil is now facing 
one of the most crucial crises in its short democratic history. What 
appears in the media and in common sense is the call for ‘ethical 
																																								 																				
6 This is a literal rendering of the Brazilian translation of Die deutsche Ideologie; the standard 
English translation reads “the class which has the means of material production at its disposal, 
consequently also controls the means of mental production” (Marx-Engels 1976, p. 59). 
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values’ and the need for a redeemer ‘car wash’ cleaning to conquer 
the ‘cancer’ of corruption. This is a commendable operation, 
without doubt, which is finally reaching some exponents in the 
higher spheres and demonstrating a certain stability of the 
investigative and judicial institutions. But, behind this narrative, 
what really lies at the heart of the crisis is the impasse between 
ineffective and obsolete projects of society and the lack of new 
political forces to form a “historical bloc” able to galvanize the 
country around “will as operative awareness of historical necessity, 
as protagonist of a real and effective historical drama” (QC 13, § 1, 
p. 1559; SPN, p. 130). Both populist development and the 
reactionary Caesarism of economic groups are unable to promote 
the expansion of democracy and respond to the growing ‘historical 
needs’ of the masses. If the first project is eluded when it aims at 
reducing misery without breaking with capitalism and the 
mechanisms of inequality, the other repeats old formulas that lead 
to retrocession and exclusion. While much energy is consumed in 
the bonfire of ‘small-time politics’ and eroded parties, the crisis is 
exposing the fracture of a country that is still economically, socially 
and politically divided, split between the “panelaço”— in which 
people protest by banging on empty pots — of the middle/upper 
classes which feel threatened in their earnings and privileges and the 
fear of classes C and D consumed by anguish as they see the 
prospects for better living conditions moving away from them. 
Although we cannot deny that the PT Government provided a 
number of benefits for these lower classes, the framework of an 
underdeveloped and unequal country has not changed substantially. 
The permanence of the PT in power led many to think that the 
changes would occur naturally and gradually, a naïve belief that 
subdued the combativeness of the popular organizations and left 
the path clear for the growing expansion of private powers, the 
financial aristocracy, transnational companies, cartels, of a 
tremendous parallel power that has been spreading to all sectors 
without any obstacle. So, while the patronizing Bonapartism of 
‘peace and love Lulism’ favored political disarmament and a 
‘peaceful’ coexistence between classes, the “Caesarism” without 
scruple of big capital found a fertile ground to reorganize and 
strengthen itself. In no other period in the history of Brazil have the 
profits of banks and rentiers grown so fast and the empire of the 
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media and private business thriven so prodigiously, while the 
“phenomenon of transformism’ introduced by Lulism produced a 
 
scarcity of statesmen and government leaders, impoverishment of 
parliamentary life [...] hence impoverishment of cultural life […]. The 
universities and all the institutions that developed intellectual and technical 
skills were impervious to the life of the parties and the living reality of national 
life, and they created apolitical national cadres, with a purely rhetorical and 
non-national mental formation (QC 3, § 119, pp. 387-388; PN Vol. II, p. 106). 
 
In addition to revealing how illusory it is within capitalism to 
construct a government in which everyone wins, the current crisis is 
showing that the antagonism between classes “is historically 
incurable and indeed becomes especially acute with the advent of 
Caesarist forms” (QC 13, § 27, p. 1622; SPN, p. 222). These forms 
make it clear who is “[…] the sovereign that decides on the state of 
exception” (Schmitt, 1972, p. 33; Agamben, 2003) and that “[i]n a 
capitalist society no one governs without entrepreneurs. They have 
a right of veto over the country” (Bresser-Pereira, 2014). In these 
conditions, therefore, there is no possibility of pushing democracy 
beyond ‘certain limits’ because, in practice, real powers act without 
the consent of democracy and nullify popular sovereignty 
(Semeraro, 2014, pp. 195 et seq.). 
As suggested by the etymology of the word, crisis means insight, 
choice, decision to be taken when facing impasses and crossroads. 
In the crucial period Brazil is living now, the ability to discern and 
reorganize quickly can open paths to boost reactionary forces or to 
develop social and political movements able to break away from the 
current system and create a favourable condition for “an 
unprecedented expansion of historical materialism” (QC 3, § 34, p. 
311; PN Vol. II, p. 33). For Gramsci, in fact, “the crisis is the place 
of ambivalence. Of instability, conflicts and of quite powerful 
progressive dynamics” (Burgio 2007, p. 44). And, even in situations 
of impasses and serious danger, Gramsci notes that “in the 
movement of history there is never any turning back, and that 
restorations in toto do not exist” (QC 13, § 27, p. 1619; SPN, pp. 
219-220) because history remains “dialectical” (cf. QC 15, § 62, p. 
1827; SPN, p. 114) and “despite all appearances” its field is left 
open to the action of groups which know how to act politically and 
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can organize themselves to dispute hegemony (cf. QC 6, § 138, p. 
802; SPN, p. 239). 
In this way, if after the military dictatorship the main objective 
was to establish the democratic rule of law, to ensure civil and 
political liberties, now, in even more adverse times (due to the 
reigning climate of dystopia, disappointment and disorientation), in 
order not to jeopardize these achievements, it is not only a 
‘selective clean-up’ conducted by the judiciary that is necessary. The 
situation also, and above all, requires the establishment and the 
protagonism of new and more vigorous popular political 
organizations able to carry forward the process of democratization 
and make further progress, especially in the field of the socialization 
of political and economic power and in the creation of a national 
State of a popular character. In this audacious and higher political 
venture, aware that the freedom that makes democracy possible is 
the same that threatens it constantly, it will be more and more 
necessary to learn how to engage in combat in a society 
characterized by complex “relations of forces” (QC 13, § 17, pp. 
1578-1589; SPN, pp. 175-185), in which the “siege is reciprocal”, by 
sophisticated ideological instruments that feature an 
“unprecedented concentration of hegemony” (QC 6, §138, p. 802; 
PN Vol. III, p. 109). Since this is not a conjunctural crisis, but an 
“organic” and long-term global one that “cannot be overcome 
except by creating a new structure” (QC 14, § 57, p. 1716; FSPN, p. 
224), the “struggle for hegemony” will only be possible with strong 
organizations of popular collective subjects, prepared for a wide 
and capillary “war of position”, that is “compact, difficult, requiring 
exceptional abilities of patience and inventiveness” (QC 6 § 138, p. 
802; PN Vol. III, p. 109), a war that is able to create an irreplaceable 
and permanent education for self-government, without which 
“some form of Bonapartism will emerge” (QC 1, § 158, p. 139; PN 
Vol. I, p. 236). 
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